Empowering States: A Rebuttal to Dr. Greve by Chemerinsky, Erwin
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 1 Symposium: Federal Preemption of State Tort
Law: The Problem of Medical Drugs and Devices
Article 7
12-15-2005
Empowering States: A Rebuttal to Dr. Greve
Erwin Chemerinsky
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erwin Chemerinsky Empowering States: A Rebuttal to Dr. Greve, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (2006)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/7
Empowering States: A Rebuttal to
Dr. Greve
Erwin Chemerinsky*
At the abstract level, I think we agree to a large extent; but with regard
to specifics, we disagree. I argue overall that we should have government
empowered at all levels to deal with social problems. The response is that
this limits the ability to restrict government power. I agree with that. That
is why I believe that individual rights, and the Constitution's protection of
them, are so important. It is why the institution of the judiciary is crucial in
enforcing the limits of the Constitution.
I made two points concerning preemption. First, the Rehnquist Court
has been inconsistent with regard to federalism. On the one hand, the
Rehnquist Court, in the name of federalism, has greatly narrowed the scope
of Congress's power. On the other hand, the Rehnquist Court has also
narrowed the scope of state power by broadly interpreting preemption.
Dr. Greve had several responses. First, he said that there have been 105
preemption decisions by the Rehnquist Court, and they haven't followed
ideology. To the contrary, many of them have been divided exactly along
predictable ideological lines. I will just give you an example. Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly was a 5-4 decision that was split along familiar
ideological lines, 1 the same split that we saw in Bush v. Gore.
Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University School of Law.
1. See 533 U.S. 525 (2001). Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts 1, i-C,
and II-D of which were unanimous. See id. Parts Ill-A, Ill-C, and 111-D were joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. See id. Part III-B-I was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. Parts
II-A, II-B, III-B-2, and IV were joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas. See id. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, in which Justice Scalia joined. See id. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment. See id. Justice Souter filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. See id. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the
But it doesn't really get to my point. My overall point is that the
Rehnquist Court has used federalism to strike down many laws, but at the
same time the Rehnquist Court has been very sympathetic to business
challenges to state regulations. Overall, the Rehnquist Court has been very
sympathetic to states' rights when it has been a challenge to a federal law,
and not at all sympathetic to states' rights when there has been a preemption
issue.
Second, Dr. Greve says that eighty percent of the Rehnquist Court's
preemption decisions have been unanimous. But their being unanimous
really doesn't tell you anything. Let me give you an example as to why.
There was a case called Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council from just
a few years ago. 3 Massachusetts adopted a law saying that it did not want to
have any of the state's money being used to contract with companies that
were doing business in Burma.4 Burma is a country with a horrible record
with regard to human rights. This is the State of Massachusetts deciding
how it wants to spend its taxpayers' money. It's hard to think of something
more integral to states' rights than that. The Supreme Court unanimously
found this unconstitutional. 5 Is it because the Massachusetts law conflicted
with a specific federal statute or treaty? No. Instead, the Court said it was
preempted by the general authority of the federal government with regard to
foreign policy. 6 It may have been a unanimous decision, but I still think it
was wrong to find preemption in the absence of an express provision in
some federal statute or treaty keeping Massachusetts from doing this.
Third, Dr. Greve says that preemption is all about statutory
interpretation. Of course we agree that preemption is about statutory
interpretation. But what we are talking about here throughout today is how
statutes should be interpreted when it comes to preemption. Should we
broadly interpret statutes to preempt state and local laws, or should we
narrowly interpret statutes to avoid preemption of state and local laws? We
would both agree that when there is an express preemption provision that
clearly applies, there is preemption. But beyond that, the issue is where do
you put the presumption? How do you determine if there is preemption?
Just saying that it is about statutory interpretation does not help.
Indeed, my central criticism of the Rehnquist Court's preemption
decisions is that they have placed a presumption in favor of preemption and
against state authority. This was evident in the cases I mentioned in my
opening remarks. For example, it is not possible to reconcile the Geier case
judgment in part, and dissenting in part, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined, and in Part I
of which Justice Souterjoined. See id.
2. See 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined, concurred in the judgment. See id. Justice Stevens, with whom Justices
Ginsburg and Breyerjoined, dissented. See id.
3. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
4. Id. at 366-68; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22H, 22J (West 2002).
5. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.
6. See id. at 386.
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with a presumption in favor of state authority.7 The federal statute
specifically said nothing here preempts any common law action.
8
Notwithstanding that provision, the Rehnquist Court found preemption. 9 In
Lorillard Tobacco, the preemption provision was just about the content of
warning labels on cigarette ads.' 0 The Supreme Court broadly interpreted
the law to find preemption with regard to placement of cigarette ads.' And
in the Garamendi case, the only way the Supreme Court could find
preemption was by creating the implied dormant foreign affairs power of the
President. 12
Dr. Greve argues that there is a real difference between Congress
commanding the states and Congress limiting the states. Here, I very much
disagree. If Congress is commanding or if Congress is limiting, both are
restricting state authority; both have to be looked at from the same
perspective. The easiest way to see this is that almost anything can be
phrased either as a command or a limit depending on what words you want
to choose. Take New York v. United States, where Congress commanded the
states to clean up their nuclear waste.13 But that could just as easily be
phrased as a prohibition than as a command. Congress prohibited states
from leaving nuclear waste around that was not cleaned up.14 Command or
prohibition; it just depends on the label you want to choose.
Another example is Printz v. United States. Dr. Greve says that it is a
command. Congress was compelling states to do background checks before
issuing permits for firearms. 16 I think it can just as easily be phrased as a
prohibition. Congress was prohibiting states from issuing permits unless
they did background checks.'
Similarly, in Reno v. Condon, it seems that it is a prohibition against
states from releasing driver's license information. 18 The Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994 says that state Departments of Motor Vehicles cannot
release certain information, such as home addresses, Social Security
numbers, and driver's license information. 19  Dr. Greve said that is a
7. See generally Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (limiting state authority).
8. Id. at 868.
9. Id. at 866.
10. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 542 (2001).
11. Id. at 550-51.
12. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003).
13. 505 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1992).
14. See id.
15. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
16. Id. at 902.
17. See id.
18. 528 U.S. 141,144 (2000).
19. Id.
prohibition. I think it just as easily can be understood as a command.
Congress commanded the states to keep this information secret. Command
or prohibition, I think they are interchangeable. To me, what is important is
when do allow the states to make the choices, and when not. And I think
that we should empower the states to make choices unless there is clear
congressional prohibition.
And that goes directly to my second point where I argue for an
alternative vision of federalism based on empowerment. I argue that we
should give Congress the authority that it had from the mid-1930s to the
1990s with regard to the Commerce Clause, Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment, sovereign immunity, and so on. We should allow preemption
only if there is express preemption or a conflict between federal and state
law. And even that should be restrictively interpreted to situations where
federal law and state law are mutually exclusive. Here I think we generally
agree. I believe in the dormant Commerce Clause as well. I think that
Marbury v. Madison basically got it right here.2° I think that, however, what
we have to do is interpret the Constitution in light of all American history in
the world that we live in today. The world we live in today needs federal
authority far greater than anybody could have imagined in 1787. It needs
government regulation with regard to health and safety far more than
anybody could have imagined in 1787. And I think it is absurd to say, what
would the Framers have intended with regard to federal or state relations for
car safety or with regard to medical devices? The world was so radically
different then. My conclusion is, let us achieve the overall wisdom of the
Framers, let us empower all levels of government. If Congress doesn't like
what a state and local government has done, Congress has the authority to
preempt it. But the absence of express preemption, absent mutual
exclusivities, does not preempt state and local laws. Let state and local
governments regulate state health and safety.
20. See 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (holding that any law that is in conflict with the United States
Constitution is void).
